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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
International  economic  literature  has  given  substantial  attention  to  the 
destabilizing effects of financial globalization, a process that became particularly strong 
since  industrial  countries  liberalized  their  capital  accounts  in  the  1970s  and  1980s. 
Subsequently, in the 1990s, emerging markets (EMs) followed suit. 
Among  the  diverse  proposals  for  reforming  the  “international  financial 
architecture” aimed at creating a more stable environment is taxation of international 
capital flows
3.  The idea, in fact, has been around since Keynes [1936] suggested that 
taxing financial transactions could strengthen the importance investors place on long-
term fundamentals in pricing assets. Decades later, the idea gained popularity in the 
academic community through the Tobin Tax proposal (Tobin [1978]). 
Much of the recent literature has defended imposing controls on capital inflow, 
as Chile did during the 1990s. The objective would be to minimize the impact on EMs 
of  capital  flows  instability  and  to  reduce  these  countries’  vulnerability  to  financial 
crises
4. The proposals defend, in general, what we could call ex ante capital controls, 
i.e., restrictions that are defined prior to funds entering the country, thereby respecting 
the contracts. This type of control differs from those the literature has called controls on 
capital outflows, which are generally imposed during a financial crisis, typically after, 
or ex post, the entry of capital, and can thus be viewed as breaching contracts with 
foreign  investors  who  have  then  already  invested  resources  in the  country.  Ex  ante 
capital  controls  usually  try  to  deter  capital  inflows,  but  could  conceivably  be  also 
imposed to restrict capital outflows. 
Here, we address the effects of ex ante capital controls. In contrast to ex post 
controls,  ex  ante  controls  should  not  jeopardize  the  emerging  market  country’s 
reputation,  since  they  are  included  in  contracts with  foreign  investors  prior  to  their 
investing.  We  will  analyze  the  effectiveness  of  inflow  controls  to  limit  short-term 
capital and modify the composition of financial inflows. 
  Several  authors  have  suggested  controls  on  capital  inflows  as  an  economic 
policy measure for managing excessive capital inflows into EMs. In periods of greater 
liquidity and low international risk aversion, it is common for substantial financial flows 
to move into Latin America and Asia. The year 2004 was a classic example: “dollar 
weakness”, or expectations of greater depreciation of the U.S. dollar due to forecasts 
that the U.S. current account deficit had to be reversed
5, together with low base interest 
rates in developed countries. Both factors led to substantial capital inflows into EMs. As 
a result, Colombia adopted capital inflow controls to avoid accelerated appreciation of 
its  currency,  and  many  countries,  including  Brazil,  Russia,  China,  Japan,  and  other 
Asian  countries,  rapidly  accumulated  international  reserves  so  as  to  manage  the 
abundant inflow of foreign currency. In this context, discussion surrounding controls on 
capital inflow has gained considerable steam among economists.  
The central goal of establishing capital controls is containing the inflow of short-
term capital. Short-term capital flows are considered more volatile and fungible and 
thus more closely related to excessive exchange rate volatility and to sudden reversals 
of external financing which lead to harmful real results. Many articles actually argue 
                                                
3 Rogoff [1999], Eichengreen[1999], Stiglitz[1999] and Fischer[2002] are excellent references on the 
diverse proposals for reforming the international financial system.   
4 See Stiglitz [1999], Ito and Portes [1998], Eichengreen [1999], and Fischer [2002].   
5 Obstfeld and Rogoff [2000], Obstfeld and Rogoff [2004], Roubini [2004], Blanchard and Giavazzi 
[2005] are good references for discussion of the expected weakening of the US Dollar as a result of the 
country’s record current account deficits.    3 
that portfolio investments tend to be less stable than, for example, direct investment, 
because financial assets can be sold more easily than real assets can be liquidated.
6 
Moreover,  today’s  international  financial  scenario  includes  Hedge  Funds,  many  of 
which are seeking immediate gains. As of August, 2005, it was estimated that there was 
around US$ 1.5 trillion in the hands of these financial institutions.
7 This, together with 
more sophisticated information technology, has made capital flows extremely fungible. 
Capital controls would also avoid excessive exchange rate appreciation and allow the 
central bank to regain control of monetary policy.
8 
The economic literature is therefore brimming with debate about how to manage 
excessive  capital  inflow  in  an  exceptionally  volatile  global  financial  environment. 
Volatile capital accounts and consequent volatile exchange rates (except in the case of 
fixed  exchange  rates)  influence  decisions  on  investing  in  physical  capital,  since 
investors  face  greater  uncertainty  and  higher  costs  on  currency  hedge  operations, 
thereby affecting potential GDP. In light of this, a few authors have suggested adopting 
capital inflow controls and/or accumulating international reserves as a way of handling 
heavy inflow of foreign currency and reducing the threat of sudden stops. 
Forbes [2003a] concludes that liberalization of capital accounts around the world 
did  in  fact  intensify  global  financial  instability,  but  the  correlation  between  capital 
controls and limiting vulnerability to confidence crises is not particularly close or direct, 
as many writers have argued. Forbes [2003b] also observes that the controls diminish 
microeconomic efficiency, for example by increasing the cost of capital of small and 
medium-sized companies, which have less access to financial markets. Large companies 
have  access  to  the  international  financial  market  and  to  ways  of  circumventing 
restrictions on external financing, so that they are less impacted by capital controls. 
Glick and Hutchison [2004] explore the effectiveness of controls in avoiding or 
delaying financial crises. Based on an analysis of panel data from 69 countries, they 
conclude  that  restricting  capital  did  not  bring  the  desired  results.  Eichengreen  and 
Leblang [2002], analyzing a panel of 47 countries, examine whether capital controls 
were effective in reducing the impact of financial crises in the real economy. They 
conclude that the controls impaired economic growth in periods of stability, but that 
they eased the effect on the country’s product once the crisis unfolded. However, these 
papers do not separate the effects of capital controls on inflows from those on outflows. 
This article  narrows  the  analysis  of the effectiveness of capital  controls. We 
explore whether controls on capital inflows are effective in limiting and selecting capital 
flows.  Thus,  we  analyze  whether  this  type  of  control  effectively  meets  its  primary 
objective.  The  issue  concerns  positive  economics  and  not  normative  economics. 
Naturally, if we were to show that the controls are not effective—as we will indeed 
claim it has been the case in Brazil—whether the controls are desirable or not would 
become irrelevant for policy purposes.  
 In  general,  the  literature  addresses  short-term  capital  controls  without 
considering the capacity of international investors to avoid the restrictions imposed. The 
general rule has been to implicitly assume that de jure imposition of capital controls is 
the same as their de facto application.  However, developed and sophisticated financial 
markets  present  diverse  substitute  assets  that  may  be  used  to  engineer  financial 
transactions that avoid part or all of the costs incurred by the capital controls. Garcia 
and Barcinski [1998] and Garcia and Valpassos [2000] focus on this issue for Brazil. 
                                                
6  See Dixit and Pyndick [1994], Frankel and Rose [1996], and Dornbusch [1998]. 
7 Chan, Getmansky, Haas and Lo [2006].  
8  Cowan and De Gregorio [2005] say that the goals of Chilean capital controls were to “... stem net 
inflows, avoid a large appreciation and keep control of monetary policy.”   4 
They indicate the ineffectiveness of inflow controls in reducing the inflow of capital 
seeking  the  high  returns  of  Brazilian  public  debt  between  1994  and  1996.  Papers 
addressing  the case  of Chile,  such as  those  of  Simone  and  Sorsa  [1999],  Edwards, 
Valdés and De Gregorio [2000] and  Cowan and De Gregorio [2005], also stress that 
circumvention of capital controls may have limited its effectiveness in changing the 
composition of the financial inflows.  
In  this  paper,  we  conduct  econometric  exercises—based  on  an  analysis  of 
impulse  response  functions  inspired  by  the  VAR  analysis  of  Cardoso  and  Goldfajn 
[1997]—that show that the capital controls were only effective in restricting financial 
capital  inflows  in  Brazil  in  the  1990s  for  two  to  six  months.  Our  updated  results 
corroborate those from previous papers. 
The novelty of this paper is in the methodology aimed at explaining why capital 
controls lost de facto effectiveness. This paper’s main contribution is its focus on the 
limiting  effects  that  the  avoidance  of  capital  controls  practiced  by  financial  market 
players had on the effectiveness of controls on capital inflows. Based on interviews with 
financial  market  players  active  during  the  analyzed  period,  we  exemplify  methods 
(financial strategies) that could have been used to avoid capital control laws in Brazil 
during the 1990s. 
The  article  is  divided  as  follows:  after  this  introduction,  Section  II  briefly 
discusses  capital  control  legislation;  Section  III  presents  a  VAR  analysis  aimed  at 
measuring  the  effectiveness  of  the  capital  controls  in  reducing  short-term  financial 
inflows; Section IV reports cases of avoidance of capital restrictions that explain how 
capital  controls  were  rendered  almost  ineffective;  and  Section  V  contains  the 
conclusion. 
 
II. CAPITAL CONTROLS IN BRAZIL 
 
Brazil’s exchange rate and capital controls legislation is highly complex and 
confusing, mixing normative rulings from the period of the Vargas administration in the 
thirties  with  modern  resolutions.  Exchange  rate  regulation  is  still  considered  an 
impediment to capital flows due to its complexity, and its reform is one of the most 
important issues for ensuring continued development of the Brazilian financial market
9. 
The  legal  framework  for  exchange  rate  transactions  and  foreign  capital 
establishes  the  following  key  points:  foreign  exchange  must  be  converted  into  the 
national  currency,  the  real  (BRL),  which  is  the  only  legal  tender  in  the  country; 
resources secured offshore or those addressed in Law 4131/62
10 must be brought back 
into the country; export revenues earned abroad must be brought back into the country 
(surrender  requirements);  and  private  exchange  rate  transactions  are  prohibited, 
meaning  the  Central  Bank  holds  a  monopoly  on  exchange  rate  transactions.  In 
summary, the legal framework is aimed at keeping all possible foreign exchange in the 
country. 
 In March of 2005, the National Monetary Council (CMN) simplified currency 
legislation in an effort to streamline and reduce the costs of capital flow with Brazil. It 
did not, however, change the legal framework or any laws, but rather published new 
CMN resolutions. These measures are part of a process of liberalization and correction 
of the asymmetries of legislation governing currency transactions with other countries, 
which the Central Bank undertook some years ago. Among the principal measures, we 
                                                
9 Reforms of exchange rate regulations are also needed to support the increased amount of international 
trade, but we will not touch on this important issue here. 
10 Law 4131 of 1962 regulates foreign capital in the country.   5 
note: merging of the Free Rate (MCTL) and Floating Rate (MCTF) Exchange Markets, 
since Brazil still legally had a system with multiple exchange rates; authorization to 
make direct offshore remittances without use of the CC-5 accounts
11; a longer period for 
bringing  foreign  currency  revenues  from  exports  back  into  the  country;  and 
authorization  of  Foreign  Forward  Currency  Agreements  (ACC)  for  exportation  of 
services.  
  The  following  economic  papers  address  Brazil’s  tangled  exchange  rate  and 
foreign capital legislation: Franco [1990], Cardoso and Goldfajn [1997], Garcia and 
Barcinski [1998], Garcia and Valpassos [2000], Arida [2003], Franco and Pinho-Neto 
[2004], and Goldfajn and Minella [2005]. The annual Bulletins of Brazil’s Central Bank 
also  address  the  issue,  discussing  exchange  rate  policy  and  summarizing  the  legal 
proceedings of the institution, the CMN, and the Ministry of Finance during the course 
of the year. In this section, we present an overview of this legislation to offer a context 
for discussing the effectiveness of controls on capital inflows. 
  Much of prevailing exchange rate legislation was established over 60 years ago. 
Only exchange rate rules for foreign direct investments remained stable, as Franco and 
Pinho-Neto [2004] emphasize. 
  In 1931, Decree 20.451/31 conceded the monopoly of exchange rate transactions 
to the Banco do Brasil and established what was called the “centralization of foreign 
exchange transactions.” Decree 25.258/33 consolidated the exchange rate policy and 
defined  “illicit  exchange  rate  transactions”  as  those  conducted  outside  the  official 
monopoly, or subsequently by establishments the monopoly holder authorized for such. 
Today this holder is the Central Bank of Brazil. This Decree 25.258/33 is still in effect 
and  stipulates  that  “understating  the  value  of  export  cover  or  increasing  prices  of 
imported goods to obtain undue cover is punishable by law.” Until today this 1933 
ruling  requires  exporters  to  convert  their  offshore  revenues  into  domestic  currency 
(surrender  requirements)  and  penalizes  overpricing  of  imports  and  underpricing  of 
exports. The maximum term for bringing export revenues back to Brazil has changed 
numerous times. As noted above, in March of 2005 the term was extended to 210 days 
after shipping, as compared to the previous 180 days (Resolution 3266/05).  
  Rules for foreign capital in Brazil were consolidated under Law 4.131 of 1962, 
which remains in effect today. As Franco and Pinho-Neto [2004] noted, “subsequent 
laws smoothed some of the more prominent edges of Law 4.131/62,” but government 
authorities still have substantial discretionary power to impose or reverse restrictive 
measures for exchange rate flows. 
  In general, current legislation still clearly allows the CMN to set measures for 
controlling foreign capital flows. One example is the set of restrictive measures that 
may be enacted in the event of “urgent needs of foreign exchange,” as defined in Article 
28 of Law 4.131/62
12: simple administrative decisions can establish controls on capital 
                                                
11 “CC-5” accounts were maintained by those not residing in Brazil and were created by the Central 
Bank’s Directive No. 5 in 1969. These resources had free access to the MCTF (Floating Rate Exchange 
Market) to purchase foreign currency and send it offshore. It also authorized remittance from others 
through the account. “CC-5” accounts were the main vehicle for both residents and non-residents to 
access foreign markets. 
12 Law 4.131/62 Art.28 
  “Art. 28 – Any time there is extreme imparity  in the balance of payments,  or  serious grounds 
for assessing there will be, the National Monetary Council may impose restrictions, for a limited period 
of time, on the entry and exit of revenues in foreign currency, and to this end, grant the Banco do Brasil a 
complete or partial monopoly on exchange rate transactions.  
   6 
outflows  and  foreign  exchange  centralization.  This  attests  to  the  uncertainties 
surrounding Brazil’s legislation, signaled by Bacha, Arida and Lara-Rezende [2005] as 
one of the major determinants of the country’s very high sovereign risk. 
  Until the 1980s, exchange rate legislation focused primarily on foreign currency 
outflows  in  an  environment  of  restricted  capital  account’s  transactions.  It  only 
authorized  the  sending  of  foreign  capital  whose  ingress  into  the  country  was 
documented. The remittance of profits and dividends were taxed. With the 1980 debt 
crisis,  international  capital  stopped  flowing  toward  Latin  America,  so  that  only  the 
egress and not the ingress of foreign currency had to be contained.  
  Beginning in 1987, and especially after the 1994 institution of the Real Plan, the 
Brazilian  government  adopted  a  directive  for  liberalizing  the  current  and  capital 
accounts. In the early 1990s, inflows increased, and as the economy stabilized in the 
second half of the decade and Brazil returned to the foreign debt market, the pace of 
capital  inflows  accelerated  considerably.  Chart  1  demonstrates  the  evolution  of  the 

















Source: Central Bank of Brazil 
 
  Financial  flows  to  Brazil  gained  momentum  following  renegotiation  of  the 
country’s external debt in 1994, under the Brady Plan model applied in several Latin 
American countries, and with the success of the stabilization provided by the Real Plan.  
                                                                                                                                          
§ 1 – In the case provided for in this article, remittances of capital return are prohibited, and remittance 
of their profits limited to a maximum of 10% (ten percent) per year, related to capital and reinvestments 
registered in the currency of the country of origin, in the terms set forth in Articles 3 and 4 of this Law. 
§ 2 – Revenues exceeding the percentage fixed by the National Monetary Council, as set forth in the 
preceding paragraph, must be listed with the Central Bank of Brazil, which, if the restriction provided for 
in this article is extended for over one fiscal year, may authorize the remittance, in the subsequent fiscal 
year, of the remaining amounts, if the profits made do not reach that limit. 
§ 3 – In the same cases of this article, the National Monetary Council may limit remittance of funds for 
paying "royalties" and technical, administrative or similar support up to the annual cumulative maximum 
of 5% (five percent)of the company’s gross earnings. 
§ 4 – Also in the cases of this article, the National Monetary Council is authorized to issue rulings 
limiting currency spending on “International Travel." 
§ 5 – There are no restrictions, however, on remittances of interest or amortization quotas contained in 
duly registered loan agreements.” 
 







































































































































































  CHART 1 

























Real Plan   7 
The increase of capital inflows that began at the end of 1991 generated problems 
for  managing  the  country’s  macro  economy.  Abundant  inflows  of  foreign  capital 
triggered appreciation and excessive exchange rate volatility and/or accumulation of 
international reserves, and a consequent increase of the public debt due to sterilized 
intervention. Additionally, most of the capital that entered at that time was for short-
term investments given the very high real interest rates prevailing in Brazil. This type of 
investment,  termed  carry-trade,  is  usually  reversed  very  quickly  at  the  first  sign  of 
depreciation of the receiving country’s currency. As such, it enhances the probability of 
a sudden stop, and also sparks greater economic volatility. 
  In  fact,  the  1990s  oscillated  between  periods  of  excessive  inflow,  such  as 
between 1992 and 1995 and then between 1996 and the middle of 1997, and periods of 
shortage of foreign capital in times of international crises (crisis in Mexico which hit 
Brazil in 1995, Asian crisis in 1997, and crises in Russia and Brazil in 1998 and 1999, 
respectively).  In periods of excessive inflows, controls were placed on capital inflows 
in an effort to limit short-term capital and alleviate the effects of too much foreign 
currency, causing appreciation or,  to prevent it, forcing fiscally  expensive sterilized 
interventions. In periods of shortage, controls were lifted in an attempt to attract capital 
to finance the Brazilian balance of payments, since current account deficit grew from 
3% of GDP in 1995 to 5% in 1999. Capital controls were, then, endogenous to external 
financing conditions and to monetary policy, as shown by Cardoso and Goldfajn [1997].  
  In  1987,  incentives  for  foreign  portfolio  investments  in  the  country  were 
provided  by  the  Central  Bank  of  Brazil’s  Resolution  1289,  which  exempts  foreign 
investors from income tax on capital gains in Brazil.  The Resolution’s Annex IV was 
the preferred channel by investors to make tax exempt investments in Brazil. However, 
in August 1993, to contain excess inflows of short-term capital aimed at profiting from 
the very high interest rates prevailing in Brazil, the CMN prohibited using the “Annex 
IV” mechanism to invest in government bonds. The purpose was actually to prohibit 
fixed income investing in general, authorizing only investing in the capital market. But 
numerous loopholes in the legislation opened the door for fixed income investments 
through this mechanism, as the following section shows. Fixed income investments then 
officially had to enter the country via specific funds that were subject to an IOF tax of 
5% to 9%.
13 This was one of the main measures for controlling capital inflows in the 
1990s, but the market managed to bypass it in numerous ways and reap gains from the 
high short-term interest rates without paying the IOF.  
  In 1999, Resolution 1289 was revoked by Resolution 2689, and the IOF tax was 
removed for fixed income investments.
14 Currently, most capital flows are registered in 
the Central Bank’s electronic registration system, the RDE,
15 including most of those 
                                                
13 In November of 1993, the Foreign Capital Fixed Income Fund was established, charging a 5% IOF tax 
(IOF stands for Tax on Financial Transactions, which is a tax that can be easily and quickly imposed or 
changed by the Ministry of Finance, not having to wait to the following fiscal year to take effect). In 
October 1994, the IOF was raised to 9%. In March of 1995, due to the Tequila Effect (Mexican Crisis), 
the IOF was lowered to 5%, and then raised again in August of that year to 7%. In April of 1997, it was 
lowered from 7% to 2%, and in March of 1999 to 0.5%. In August of 1999 this IOF was eliminated, but 
the capital from the investment write-off had to be invested on the BOVESPA for at least one day, or be 
held without remuneration for 15 days. For investments of less than 90 days, a 5% IOF tax is levied even 
today (May 2006).  
14 Traders in Brazil still refer to the investment mechanism of the prevailing Resolution 2689 as “Annex 
IV.” 
15 The RDE is divided into IED, ROF and Portfolio registration.  RDE-IED: Foreign Direct Investment;  
RDE-ROF: Financial Transaction Registration: financing and importation, commercial leasing, rental and 
freight, services and technology, currency loans, advance payment of exports, and asset investments;  
RDE-Portfolio: portfolio investing.   8 
governed by Resolution 2689. The process allows for closer monitoring and greater 
transparency of financial flows. Only very short term (less than 90 days) fixed income 
investments are charged the 5% IOF tax. There are also rules in Annex V of Resolution 
2689  for Depositary Receipts  (DR), when shares  of Brazilian companies are  issued 
abroad with counterpart shares in Brazil. This movement is not registered in the RDE. 
Finally, until March of 2005, the account for non-residents (CC-5) was still in place. It 
was not declared on the RDE and served as a vehicle for foreign capital to enter the 
country.   
  Controls on capital inflows, rather, ex ante controls on capital inflows, in the 
1990s  focused  largely  on  limiting  short  term  inflows,  restricting  fixed  income 
investments and short term loans. Export revenues were also strictly regulated. As we 
have seen, since 1933 exporters have been subject to surrender requirements within a 
specified  period,  today  210  days.  Forward  foreign  currency  agreements  (ACC),  a 
mechanism to provide credit for exports are also restricted even today to a maximum 
360 days prior to shipping.  
  Based on the  methodology of  Cardoso and  Goldfajn [1997], we updated the 
index of controls on capital inflows and outflows through 2004. The original article had 
constructed  the  index  through  1996,  and  we  updated  them  for  this  paper.  The 
methodology is simple: add +1 to the base index if the control restricts the analyzed 
type of flow (inflow or outflow), and -1 if it liberalizes it. The methodology applies to 




























                                                
16 However simple, this  methodology  has the drawback  of considering that all  measures had similar 
effects on capital flows, which is clearly a problem. Nevertheless, we believe that the indices rightly 
capture the major trends. 
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CHART 3 















Chart  3  clearly  shows  that  since  the  early  1990s  a  trend  toward  liberalizing 
outflows has prevailed. Yet, Chart 2 shows that only beginning in 1997 was there an 
unequivocal trend toward liberalizing capital inflows. This is because between 1997 and 
1999 there were a crisis in Asia, a crisis in Russia, and a currency crisis in Brazil, so 
there was no need for adopting controls on capital inflows. In 1999, Brazil floated its 
currency and defined a clear directive for liberalizing the capital account in order to reap 
the benefits of external savings. One example was in August of 1999, when the IOF tax 
was lifted for fixed income foreign investments of over 90 days that were previously 
under Annex IV.   
  In  the  next  section  we  provide  econometric  evidence  of  the  very  limited 
effectiveness of the controls on capital inflows imposed by Brazilian authorities in the 
1990s. 
 
III - A VAR ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INFLOW CONTROLS 
IN DETERRING CAPITAL INFLOWS 
 
  In this section we conduct an econometric analysis using a vector autoregression 
model to examine whether controls on capital inflows in Brazil have been effective in 
reducing the inflow of financial capital.  
The methodology is based on the articles of Cardoso and Goldfajn [1997] and 
Edwards, Valdés and De Gregório [2000], which used the VAR model to analyze the 
effectiveness of capital controls in Brazil and in Chile, respectively. 
 Cardoso and Goldfajn [1997] examined the effect of controls on capital inflows 
in the period from 1983 to 1995, concluding that the impact of inflow controls on the 
total  net  inflow  was  temporary  (around  six  months).    They  used  VAR  estimation, 
because they showed that the controls are endogenous to the dynamic of the capital 
inflows. Here, we apply  a similar procedure to the period between 1995  and 2001, 
using, however, different capital inflow measures and other endogenous variables. We 
chose not to extend the sample beyond 2001 given there were very few changes to 
legislation on capital inflows between then and 2004, so there is little to be inferred 
from the period about the effect of controls on capital flows
17.  
                                                
17 See the chart with the Capital Inflow Controls Index in Section IV.  
 






































































































































   10 
  Edwards,  Valdés  and  De  Gregório  [2000]  estimated  a  VAR  to  analyze 
simultaneously the effectiveness of controls in containing capital inflows and in altering 
the term of foreign investments. They used as one of the endogenous variables a Power 
Index  for  monitoring  the  effect  of  control  circumvention  on  the  effectiveness  of 
restrictions on short term capital. We did not build a similar index from Brazil because 
we  felt  that,  with  the  available  data,  its  accuracy  and  reliability  would  not  be 
sufficient.
18 Edwards, Valdés and De Gregório [2000] concluded that Chile’s control on 
capital inflows did not effectively reduce the total capital inflow, but it did increase the 
percentage of long term flows. In other words, the controls were effective in reducing 
short term capital, but the total inflow remained stable as more long term capital entered 
the country. However, they argued that the result may be distorted by short term capital 
investments that were declared as long term.  They could not guarantee that the control 
power index was able to isolate the effect of this type of avoidance.  
  In this section we estimate three VARs. They differ in the variable that measures 
capital inflows. Charts 4 and 5 show the different series we used on a monthly base and 
accumulated in 12 months. 
 
            CHART 4 











































































































































Annex IV Net Investment Portfolio Capital Inflow Contracted Financial Capital Inflows
 
 





                                                
18 The index is formed by attributing rates of 0 to 1 for each new restrictive measure. When the restriction 
was  applied,  the  measure  received  a  rating  of  1.  With  the  passing  of  time,  if  the  restriction  was 
circumvented,  the  rating  moved  closer  to  0,  where  the  measure  was  assessed  as  having  lost  all 
effectiveness. Establishing a similar index for Brazil was a complex task, because it involved a large 
number of exchange rate of measures and because the Brazilian financial market was more developed 
than the Chilean.    11 
CHART 5 
 
Financial Capital Flows Measures




































































































































Annex IV Net Investment Portfolio Capital Inflow Contracted Financial Capital Inflows
 
 
Source: Central Bank of Brazil and CVM 
 
 
The capital inflow measure of the first VAR is the Brazilian Central Bank series on the 
inflow of portfolio investments in Brazil. The inflow measure of the second VAR is the 
contracted exchange rate inflows for financial transactions. The measure for the third is 
net investments through the Annex IV channel. The use of three different measures of 
capital inflows is aimed at providing robustness to our analysis. All of the VARs have 
the same endogenous variables: the deviation of the effective real exchange rate to its 
equilibrium level, the covered interest parity differential, the measure of capital inflows, 
and the logarithmic difference of the index of capital inflow controls. The exogenous 
variables varied in the VAR specifications. The number of lags for each VAR was 
chosen based on the Akaike and the Schwartz information criteria. In order to obtain the 
impulse response functions, we applied the Cholesky decomposition for identifying a 
VAR’s structural form. It is essential to note that the results were robust with the several 
orderings  of  contemporaneous  causality  among  the  endogenous  variables,  so  this 
possible criticism does not affect our results. 
  The main objective of the estimation of these VARs is to analyze the impulse 
response  function  of  the  capital  flows  to  a  change  in  capital  inflow  controls.  The 
variation from the index of capital inflow restrictions presented in Section III was used 
as the measure of capital controls. It is important to clarify that the index’s order of 
integration is equal to 1, so that we had to use the first difference to obtain a stationary 
series. In Chart 6 below, we present the capital inflow controls variation series. From 
1983 to 1995, the series was constructed, as we have already noted, on Cardoso and 
Goldfajn [1997], and updated for this article after 1995. 
 
 
   12 
Restrictions on Capital  Inflows






































































































































































   
The results were as follows:  
The first VAR has the following endogenous variables: 
-  Logarithmic  variation  of  the  equilibrium  real  effective  interest  rate 
(LOG(REER_DESVIO2)), which was calculated as the logarithm of the ratio between 
the  index  value  of  the  real  effective  exchange  rate  and  a  series  trend  extracted  by 
applying the Hodrick-Prescott filter beginning January of 1995.  
  -  Covered  interest  parity  differential  (CIPD)  in  continuous  capitalization,  or 
LOG(1+CIPD), where LOG is the logarithm in the Neperian base.  
  - Logarithm of the portfolio investment inflows as a percentage of the GDP 
(LOG(IEC_CRED/PIB)), which is our capital flow measure in this first VAR. 
  -  Finally,  the  logarithmic  variation  of  the  Index  of  Capital  Inflow  Controls 
(D(LOG(ICC)).   
  The  exogenous  variables  used  were  the  American  one-year  futures  rates 
(LOG(1+US1Y)), which summarize the level of international liquidity; the variation of 
the Index of Capital Outflow Controls (D(LOG(ICC_S)), which was calculated as an 
exogenous  variable  because  we  considered  that  economic  policy  had  lifted  outflow 
controls independent of capital flows, as indicated by the downward trend of the ICC-O 
in Chart 3 of Section II; and lastly, some circumstantial dummies from the period of the 
Brazilian  currency  crisis.  Dummies  for  other  periods  of  financial  crisis  were  not 
significant,  since  the  effects  were  probably  captured  by  the  endogenous  variables, 
especially  the  real  exchange  rate  and  the  covered  interest  parity  differential.  The 
exception was the wave of speculation in 1998, when there was a large inflow of capital 
even with the higher sovereign risk, followed by a mass exodus after depreciation, for 
which a binary dummy variable was applied.  
  Table 2 VAR01 summarizes the output of the first VAR estimation, and Chart 7 
shows  the  impulse  response  function  of  the  portfolio  investment  inflows  to  new 
restrictions on capital inflows. We see that a new control measure on capital inflows 
initially  reduces  the  portfolio  investment  inflows  and  peaks  in  the  second  month. 
However, its effectiveness diminishes rapidly, and up to around six months following 
its  implementation,  the  effect  on  capital  flows  disappears.  Therefore,  the  exercise 
indicates that controls  on capital inflows  in Brazil  are  temporarily effective,  lasting 
CHART 6   13 
 Vector Autoregression Estimates
 Sample(adjusted): 1995:03 2001:01
 Included observations: 71 after adjusting endpoints
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]
LOG(REER_DESVIO2) LOG(1+CIPD) LOG(IEC_CRED/PIB_USD) D(LOG(ICC))
LOG(REER_DESVIO2(-1)) 0.848994 -0.063483 -0.065995 -0.04362
-0.06995 -0.02975 -0.81052 -0.02845
[ 12.1367] [-2.13415] [-0.08142] [-1.53336]
LOG(1+CIPD(-1)) 0.002434 0.993933 -0.057779 0.148311
-0.15516 -0.06598 -1.7978 -0.0631
[ 0.01569] [ 15.0641] [-0.03214] [ 2.35048]
LOG(IEC_CRED(-1)/PIB_USD(-1)) -0.029375 -0.010079 0.465205 0.004209
-0.00986 -0.00419 -0.11421 -0.00401
[-2.98003] [-2.40444] [ 4.07310] [ 1.04999]
D(LOG(ICC(-1))) -0.055859 -0.235101 -5.725003 -0.001572
-0.33932 -0.14429 -3.93165 -0.13799
[-0.16462] [-1.62932] [-1.45613] [-0.01139]
C 0.022708 -0.025619 -0.424531 -0.007136
-0.07133 -0.03033 -0.82644 -0.02901
[ 0.31836] [-0.84466] [-0.51368] [-0.24601]
LOG(1+US1Y) -2.027193 -0.088474 -19.21475 0.07025
-1.25812 -0.535 -14.5774 -0.51163
[-1.61129] [-0.16537] [-1.31812] [ 0.13731]
D(LOG(ICC_S(-1))) -1.346541 -0.294861 14.68138 -0.356286
-0.89256 -0.37955 -10.3418 -0.36297
[-1.50863] [-0.77687] [ 1.41961] [-0.98158]
DUM98_06 -0.022205 -0.007393 -0.183745 0.000461
-0.03602 -0.01532 -0.41732 -0.01465
[-0.61651] [-0.48273] [-0.44030] [ 0.03146]
DUM98_09 -0.017627 0.014355 -1.193587 -0.00198
-0.03742 -0.01591 -0.43353 -0.01522
[-0.47110] [ 0.90224] [-2.75317] [-0.13015]
DUM98_10 -0.072689 -0.031912 0.784007 -0.00372
-0.04323 -0.01838 -0.50086 -0.01758
[-1.68154] [-1.73603] [ 1.56532] [-0.21161]
DUM98_11 -0.033384 -0.007341 -1.097422 -0.015072
-0.03745 -0.01593 -0.43398 -0.01523
[-0.89131] [-0.46092] [-2.52874] [-0.98951]
DUM98_12 -0.058555 -0.016687 -0.69168 0.001728
-0.03929 -0.01671 -0.45521 -0.01598
[-1.49044] [-0.99883] [-1.51949] [ 0.10816]
DUM99_01 0.141244 0.010355 -0.428468 -0.021543
-0.03941 -0.01676 -0.45668 -0.01603
[ 3.58358] [ 0.61781] [-0.93822] [-1.34407]
 R-squared 0.863004 0.866213 0.404071 0.161514
 Adj. R-squared 0.834661 0.838533 0.280775 -0.011966
 Sum sq. resids 0.06632 0.011993 8.903604 0.010968
 S.E. equation 0.033815 0.014379 0.391804 0.013751
 F-statistic 30.44762 31.29377 3.277248 0.931025
 Log likelihood 146.9012 207.6138 -27.03869 210.7849
 Akaike AIC -3.771866 -5.482079 1.12785 -5.571405
 Schwarz SC -3.357572 -5.067785 1.542144 -5.157111
 Mean dependent -0.00975 0.068627 -2.797709 -0.004711
 S.D. dependent 0.083161 0.035785 0.461994 0.01367
 Determinant Residual Covariance 2.68E-12
 Log Likelihood (d.f. adjusted) 542.9422
 Akaike Information Criteria -13.82936
 Schwarz Criteria -12.17218
around two to six months. This period would be the time required for the market to 
discover investment alternatives for circumventing the restriction.
19  
 
TABLE 2: VAR 01 – Portfolio Investment Capital Flows 
 
                                                
19 The confidence intervals of the impulse response functions in our exercise are wide and limit the 
potential of our results. A similar problem occurred with the VARs of Goldfajn and Cardoso [1997] and 
Edwards, Valdés and De Gregório [2000]. For future research, refining of the ICC may imply narrower 
confidence intervals.    14 
CHART 7 
  The  second  VAR  has  the  same  endogenous  variables  as  the  first  with  the 
exception of the capital inflow measure, which becomes the contracted exchange rate 
inflows  for  financial  transactions  as  a  percentage  of  the  GDP 
(LOG(MOV_CAMBIO_FIN_COMPRA/PIB)).    These  are  data  from  the  Brazilian 
Central Bank that report the currency flows from all financial investments except for 
those going through the CC-5 account, that is to say, they do not include exchange rate 
flows from abroad and the CC-5 accounts. This series included all flows from portfolio 
capital, direct investments and foreign loans. Since the capital controls exempted direct 
investment flows, we used this data as an exogenous variable. The other exogenous 
variables are the same as those in the first VAR. 
  Chart 8 shows the impulse response function of the contracted exchange rate 
inflows for financial transactions to the new restrictions on capital inflows. Again, the 
exercise indicates that the effectiveness of inflow controls was temporary and lasted for 
around two to six months. Chart 9 shows the impulse response function of the capital 
inflow  controls  to  an  increase  in  capital  inflows:  we  see  that  control  tends  to  be 
tightened  when  capital  inflows  increase,  which  is  consistent  with  the  findings  on 
endogeneity of controls indicated by Cardoso and Goldfajn [1997]. The third VAR will 
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Response of LOG(IEC_CRED/PIB_USD) to Cholesky
One S.D. D(LOG(ICC)) Innovation  15 
 Vector Autoregression Estimates
 Sample(adjusted): 1995:04 2001:01
 Included observations: 70 after adjusting endpoints





LOG(REER_DESVIO2(-1)) 1.596 0.2162 -1.297422 -0.100528
-0.12063 -0.05501 -0.46469 -0.06268
[ 13.2301] [ 3.93000] [-2.79201] [-1.60372]
LOG(REER_DESVIO2(-2)) -0.76867 -0.268611 0.956407 0.0504
-0.12135 -0.05534 -0.46743 -0.06305
[-6.33453] [-4.85404] [ 2.04608] [ 0.79931]
LOG(1+CIPD(-1)) -1.056099 0.679976 1.186595 0.169177
-0.31673 -0.14444 -1.22005 -0.16458
[-3.33442] [ 4.70776] [ 0.97258] [ 1.02794]
LOG(1+CIPD(-2)) 0.97209 0.198835 -0.827889 0.068802
-0.36258 -0.16535 -1.3967 -0.18841
[ 2.68102] [ 1.20252] [-0.59275] [ 0.36518]
LOG(MOVCAMBIO_FIN_
COMPRAS(-1)/PIB_USD(-
1)) 0.018765 0.002513 1.003293 0.00674
-0.02638 -0.01203 -0.10163 -0.01371
[ 0.71122] [ 0.20883] [ 9.87167] [ 0.49163]
LOG(MOVCAMBIO_FIN_
COMPRAS(-2)/PIB_USD(-
2)) -0.035169 -0.009047 -0.359534 0.003547
-0.02523 -0.01151 -0.09718 -0.01311
[-1.39402] [-0.78636] [-3.69954] [ 0.27054]
D(LOG(ICC(-1))) 0.059725 -0.1086 -2.215967 -0.070253
-0.28181 -0.12851 -1.08555 -0.14643
[ 0.21193] [-0.84505] [-2.04133] [-0.47976]
D(LOG(ICC(-2))) 0.008505 0.124223 0.495162 -0.096286
-0.27883 -0.12716 -1.07409 -0.14489
[ 0.03050] [ 0.97693] [ 0.46101] [-0.66456]
C 0.014042 -0.025425 0.111609 -0.045985
-0.07082 -0.03229 -0.27279 -0.0368
[ 0.19829] [-0.78729] [ 0.40914] [-1.24965]
LOG(1+US1Y) -0.868745 0.149802 -7.091789 0.770644
-1.38204 -0.63025 -5.32373 -0.71814
[-0.62860] [ 0.23768] [-1.33211] [ 1.07311]
LOG(FDI/PIB_USD) 0.000618 -0.00281 0.12433 -0.001046
-0.00637 -0.00291 -0.02456 -0.00331
[ 0.09698] [-0.96666] [ 5.06297] [-0.31565]
D(LOG(ICC_S)) -1.630759 -0.129044 3.996622 -0.129792
-0.76518 -0.34894 -2.94752 -0.3976
[-2.13122] [-0.36981] [ 1.35593] [-0.32644]
DUM98_06 -0.006115 0.000449 -0.248249 -0.002908
-0.0287 -0.01309 -0.11056 -0.01491
[-0.21305] [ 0.03433] [-2.24530] [-0.19501]
DUM98_09 -0.010423 0.021473 -0.164069 0.000891
-0.03136 -0.0143 -0.12078 -0.01629
[-0.33243] [ 1.50171] [-1.35836] [ 0.05468]
DUM98_10 0.002162 -0.006708 -0.28825 0.003468
-0.03334 -0.01521 -0.12844 -0.01733
[ 0.06485] [-0.44114] [-2.24427] [ 0.20015]
DUM98_11 -0.053352 -0.011768 -0.125101 -0.008403
-0.02978 -1.36E-02 -0.11471 -0.01547
[-1.79157] [-0.86656] [-1.09057] [-0.54303]
DUM98_12 -0.021103 -0.000484 -0.114811 0.003305
-0.03068 -0.01399 -0.11818 -0.01594
[-0.68787] [-0.03461] [-0.97153] [ 0.20729]
DUM99_01 0.172991 0.023576 -0.032087 -0.020608
-0.02993 -0.01365 -0.1153 -0.01555
[ 5.77975] [ 1.72729] [-0.27831] [-1.32504]
 R-squared 0.925925 0.917272 0.927996 0.227275
 Adj. R-squared 0.901708 0.890226 0.904456 -0.025346
 Sum sq. resids 0.035599 0.007403 0.52824 0.009612
 S.E. equation 0.026165 0.011932 0.100789 0.013596
 F-statistic 38.23482 33.91548 39.42249 0.899667
 Log likelihood 166.1117 221.0752 71.70878 211.9372
 Akaike AIC -4.231763 -5.802149 -1.534537 -5.541062
 Schwarz SC -3.653578 -5.223964 -0.956352 -4.962878
 Mean dependent -0.010592 0.068454 -2.025573 -0.004352
 S.D. dependent 0.083457 0.036013 0.326072 0.013427
 Determinant Residual Covariance 1.09E-13
 Log Likelihood (d.f. adjusted) 647.389
 Akaike Information Criteria -16.43969
 Schwarz Criteria -14.12695
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Response of LOG(MOVCAMBIO_FIN_COMPRAS/PIB_USD) to Cholesky
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Response of D(LOG(ICC)) to LOG(MOVCAMBIO_FIN_COMPRAS/PIB_USD)
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
 
The  third  VAR  uses  net  investments  through  Annex  IV  as  the  capital  flow 
measure. No series for capital inflows through this channel are available, but only data 
on the total portfolio value under Annex IV in the country. Therefore, in this VAR we 
used a logarithmic difference of the Annex IV portfolio as the measure of net capital 
inflow. As in our other estimations, we considered capital flows as a percentage of the 
GDP (D(LOG(CART_ANEXO4/PIB)). The other endogenous variables were the same 
as  those  of  the  previous  estimations.  As  an  exogenous  variable,  we  used  only  one 
dummy for the Brazilian currency crisis, because the other variables we adopted were 
not statistically significant in this exercise.    17 
  Once again, the impulse response function of the capital flow measure to a new 
capital inflow control measure (Chart 10) indicated that restrictions on financial inflows 
were effective only temporarily. In the case of flows through Annex IV, the effect of the 
controls  appears  to  be  even  more  transitory,  lasting  only  two  to  three  months. 
Strikingly, most avoidance cases, as we saw in the previous section, continued using the 
Annex  IV  channel  to  invest  so  as  to  guarantee  tax  benefits.  The  impulse  response 
function of Chart 11 shows the authorities reaction to the increase in Annex IV inflows. 
Greater capital inflows using this means led to tighter restrictions on capital inflows. 
This result shows the endogeneity of capital controls to capital inflows, consistent with 
the findings of Goldfajn and Cardoso [1997]. 
 
TABLE 4: VAR 03 – Capital flows through Annex IV Channel 
 Vector Autoregression Estimates
 Sample(adjusted): 1995:03 2001:01
 Included observations: 71 after adjusting endpoints
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]
LOG(REER_DESVIO2) LOG(1+CIPD) D(LOG(CART_ANEXO4/PIB_USD)) D(LOG(ICC))
LOG(REER_DESVIO2(-1)) 0.899085 -0.030183 0.423416 -0.040701
-0.06799 -0.02438 -0.2035 -0.02269
[ 13.2230] [-1.23805] [ 2.08071] [-1.79397]
LOG(1+CIPD(-1)) -0.021034 0.987582 0.064443 0.139635
-0.15871 -0.05691 -0.47501 -0.05296
[-0.13252] [ 17.3541] [ 0.13567] [ 2.63670]
D(LOG(CART_ANEXO4(-1)/PIB_USD(-1))) -0.101546 -0.046076 -0.024486 0.027486
-0.04225 -0.01515 -0.12645 -0.0141
[-2.40343] [-3.04149] [-0.19364] [ 1.94971]
D(LOG(ICC(-1))) 1.79E-05 -0.250229 -1.604453 0.00612
-0.36086 -0.12939 -1.08001 -0.12041
[ 5.0E-05] [-1.93392] [-1.48559] [ 0.05083]
C -0.004639 -0.001172 -0.003257 -0.013619
-0.01232 -0.00442 -0.03686 -0.00411
[-0.37671] [-0.26539] [-0.08837] [-3.31422]
DUM_BRASIL 0.036762 -0.001772 0.028608 -0.009482
-0.01481 -0.00531 -0.04434 -0.00494
[ 2.48140] [-0.33361] [ 0.64522] [-1.91825]
 R-squared 0.796892 0.858981 0.153832 0.163088
 Adj. R-squared 0.781269 0.848133 0.088742 0.09871
 F-statistic 51.00551 79.1861 2.363378 2.53329
 Determinant Residual Covariance 3.29E-13
 Log Likelihood (d.f. adjusted) 617.3627
 Akaike Information Criteria -16.71444
 Schwarz Criteria -15.94959    18 
CHART 10 
 
Therefore, the VAR exercises indicate that the controls on capital inflows were 
effective in reducing financial capital inflows only for short periods of time (two to six 
months).  The  probable  cause  of  the  limited  duration  of  the  restrictions’  impact  is 
avoidance of capital controls by the market, which continues to invest in the country 
without  incurring  in  the  capital controls’  costs by  renaming  the  type  of  investment 
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Response of D(LOG(ICC)) to D(LOG(CART_ANEXO4/PIB_USD))
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
CHART 11   19 
In the next section, we document and analyze cases of avoidance of controls on capital 
inflows in Brazil. Outflow controls have also been frequently avoided since the 1980s 
through  parallel  (black)  exchange  rate  markets,  but  our  analysis  focus  only  on  the 
effectiveness of controls on capital inflows. 
  The  key  point  is  that  measures  for  controlling  capital  inflows  are  at  best 
temporarily effective in containing and selecting capital inflows, since financial agents 
have been able to dodge them in many different ways. The lesson to be learned is that in 
open  and  developed  capital  markets,  controls  on  capital  inflows  will  probably  be 
ineffective, because the market has many alternative assets and transactions that can 
capture the desired return. In the following section, we discuss cases of circumvention, 
and  show  a  quantitative  proof  that  this  circumvention  was  at  work.  We  do  this  by 
documenting the characteristic migration of capital inflows among Annex IV items to 
avoid restrictions imposed on fixed income investments and the minimum terms for 
offshore funding. 
 
IV  -  CASES  OF  CIRCUMVENTION  OF  CAPITAL  INFLOW 
CONTROLS IN BRAZIL 
  Exchange rate and capital control legislation in Brazil, as previously noted, has a 
tradition of being highly complex and intricate. However, the Brazilian financial market 
is  also  quite  sophisticated,  particularly  in  derivatives  trading.
20  The  Futures  and 
Commodities  Exchange  (BM&F)  of  São  Paulo,  for  example,  is  one  of  the  world’s 
largest and most active derivatives exchange, comparable to the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange. Furthermore, there are extensive derivatives trading abroad with underlying 
Brazilian instruments. One example is New York trading of Brazilian Real/U.S. Dollar 
NDFs  (Non-Deliverable  Forwards).  Derivatives  allow  traders  to  replicate  financial 
strategies originally conceived with the underlying financial assets without the need to 
trade the underlying assets. For example, a box is a financial strategy involving only 
options that perfectly replicates a bond. The existence of derivatives makes the task of 
imposing capital controls much more burdensome. Since there was a well-established 
market for Brazilian financial instruments, including derivatives, there was, ipso facto, a 
variety  of  alternative  instruments  that  made  it  possible  to  circumvent  most  capital 
controls.  
  Between  1993  and  1999,  when  investors  were  prohibited  from  investing  in 
domestic Brazilian bonds through Annex IV of Resolution 1289 and charged a 5% to 
9% IOF, there were many cases where this tax was avoided. The market found a range 
of methods for investing in fixed income and enjoying the tax benefits of Annex IV, at 
very low cost. Even today, foreign investors have ways of avoiding the tax on fixed 
income returns, which is higher than the tax on returns in the equity market.
21 
  In this section (and also in the Appendix), we report numerous cases of capital 
controls avoidance in Brazil between 1993 and 2000, illustrating how difficult de facto 
application  of  capital  controls  actually  is.  We  show  that  de  jure  imposition  of 
restrictions in this period did not effectively contain capital inflows seeking short term, 
tax exempt return on fixed income, nor was it effective in extending the term of foreign 
investments on fixed income.  
                                                
20 Years of crowding out and hyperinflation created both a hypertrophy of expertise in fixed income and 
derivatives trading and a hypotrophy of credit granted by financial intermediaries. 
21 Foreign investors do not necessarily reside outside Brazil. Brazilian financial institutions generally 
have offices abroad designed to obtain tax benefits given to foreign capital, and also to shield against 
border risk, or restrictions of capital outflows.    20 
  Garber [1998] addressed the issue of how offshore derivatives trading may be 
used  to  bypass  domestic  controls.  Garcia  and  Barcinski  [1998]  and  Garcia  and 
Valpassos  [2000]  analyzed  how  avoidance  of  capital  controls  impacted  their 
effectiveness in restricting and selecting financial flows, and they reported a few of the 
methods used to circumvent controls in Brazil. Simone and Sorsa [1999] concluded that 
the capital controls in Chile in the 1990s were only temporarily effective in restricting 
short  term  capital  due  to  capital  control  circumvention.    Edwards,  Valdés  and  De 
Gregório  [2000]  concluded  that  Chile’s  capital  controls  effectively  changed  the 
composition of capital inflows, increasing the inflows of long term capital, but they cast 
doubt on the reliability of this result, which could have been distorted given that short 
term flows could have been labeled as long term capital flows, that is to say, effectively 
bypassing the country’s capital controls. Forbes [2003b] noted that small and medium-
sized companies in Chile were more burdened by the higher cost of capital than were 
large ones, because the latter had access to financial transactions on the international 
market that would enable them to avoid Chilean capital controls.  
In  this  article  we  take  a  more  in-depth  look  at  capital  controls  avoidance 
practices in Brazil based on field study involving members of the financial market, who 
offered extensive help in collecting information about what agents did in Brazil to avoid 
controls on capital inflows between 1993 and 2000.  
  The large majority of transactions reported was legal, and merely took advantage 
of loopholes in the intricate exchange rate legislation. They included renaming as long 
term  flows  that  were  ultimately  directed  at  short  term  interest  rate  investments. 
However, they were officially accounted on the balance of payments as flows destined 
for other purposes. For example, many flows were identified as “privatization money,” 
which in theory would go to finance privatization programs; short term capital was 
disguised as foreign direct investments, which were not taxed; resources were declared 
as equity investments when in fact they were used to obtain fixed income return, etc. 
Below we will provide further details of these forms of circumvention. 
  The central idea is that financial agents were able to use a variety of means to 
bypass  capital  controls.  The  major  restriction  was  prohibition  of  fixed  income 
investments through Annex IV of Resolution 1289, which carried tax exemption rights, 
as  we  reported  in  the  previous  section.  There  were  also  numerous  restrictions  for 
minimum terms for amortizing overseas loans.  
   Prohibition of fixed income investments through Annex IV is the equivalent of 
charging an inflow tax t that imposes a cost equal to the loss of tax benefits of investing 
in fixed income by other means. During the period, agents could invest in fixed income 
in Brazil through mutual funds specifically established for such, which were subject to 
an IOF tax of 5% to 9%. Hence, the official t was the IOF.  
However,  the  de  facto  cost  for  the  short  term  investor  was  the  cost  of 
circumventing the control, or t*, which was certainly less than he or she would lose by 
not investing in fixed income through Annex IV. It follows that the actual cost incurred 
by the investor due to the capital control is: t* = min {t , cost of circumventing inflow 
control}. 
Let us examine a few of the circumvention methods reported
22.  
  1)      Disguising short term investments as long term, equity or trade finance 
                                                
22  The  methods  of  bypassing  capital  controls  were  collected  by  the  authors  during  interviews  with 
Brazilian financial market players. The authors do not have information on who conducted them, or even 
if they actually took place.    21 
CASE 1:  Disguise short term capital as Foreign Direct Investment 
 
  Foreign direct investment is considered to be the best form of capital flow to the 
receiving country, because it is closely associated with investing in fixed capital and the 
transfer of technology, and consequently with expansion of the potential GDP. It is also 
thought  to  be  the least  fungible,  since compared  to  portfolio  investments;  it  is  less 
reversible and has a longer investment horizon. Many articles do argue that portfolio 
investments tend to be less stable than direct investments, because portfolio investments 
can  be  reversed  more  easily  than  real  assets  can  be  liquidated  (Dixit  and  Pyndick 
[1994], Frankel and Rose [1996], Dornbusch [1998]). Thus, direct investments would 
be less linked to capital flight. For these reasons, capital flow regulation commonly 
handles direct investments differently than portfolio investments.  
  Notwithstanding, in an environment of capital controls, when in general the flow 
of direct investments wanes, market agents tend to take advantage of this loophole in 
exchange rate legislation  to disguise their short  term  investments or  loans as direct 
investments,  thus  bypassing  the  restrictions  imposed.  In  Chile  during  1996  through 
1998, for example, what the Central Bank designated “Potentially Speculative Direct 
Investment”  was  also  subject  to  encaje,  that  is  to  say,  to  Chile’s  prevailing  capital 
controls.  This  was  because  between  1991  and  1996,  when  Chile  required  non-
remunerated  deposits  of  10%  to  30%  for  one  year  for  short  term  investments  and 
foreign loans, many agents were found to circumvent the restriction by (inappropriately) 
identifying their flows as direct investments.  
  In Brazil, we reviewed a transaction, likely to be used even today, designed to 
disguise short term capital as direct investment. The transaction has a simple structure.  
  At that time, investing in fixed income through Annex IV was restricted, but the 
channel  was  open  for  equity  investments,  and  there  were  tax  benefits  for  direct 
investments.  Financial  intermediaries could  use the transaction to take advantage of 
these two loopholes.  
  The financial intermediary would create a public corporation (S.A.) and list its 
shares on the São Paulo Stock Exchange (BOVESPA). The company was strictly a legal 
entity  and  had  no  physical  activity.  Since  the  financial  intermediary  held  all  the 
company’s  shares,  it  could  manipulate  their  price  by  arranging  purchase  and  sell 
transactions  with  low  liquidity.  The  price  was  completely  artificial.  The  financial 
intermediary,  having  capital  outside  the country, would  invest in the company as a 
foreign investor and declare this flow as direct investment. It acquired over 50% of the 
shares  and  subsequently  conducted  intercompany  loans,  considered  foreign  direct 
investments. This money, then, since the company only existed on paper, would be 
invested in fixed income. Returns would go to the company and be sent abroad as profit 
or dividends. Thus, Annex IV restrictions did not apply, even though the objective was 
short term returns from the high interest rates of the day.  
   The cost of establishing this investment in short term fixed income as a direct 
investment was quite low. Given the scale of capital invested, the cost of opening an 
S.A. corporation and listing its shares on the exchange was negligible. The agent’s cost 
to come into the country, the aforementioned t*, was fixed and much lower than the 
official  tax.
23.  The  financial  intermediary’s  only  expenses  were  for  opening  the 
                                                
23 The cost  of opening a joint-stock (S.A.) company  and listing  its  shares  on the exchange, without 
considering programs for attracting investors (contracting banks to manage the I.P.O., press, advertising, 
etc.), in 2005, is between US$20,000 and US$100,000. If the financial intermediary used this avoidance 
strategy to invest US$ 10 million in fixed income, it would already have saved, in the period when the   22 
corporation at the beginning of the operation. Subsequent investments had no inflow 
costs, meaning t* was equal to zero. The outflow costs were determined by legislation 
governing  profit and  dividend  taxing  of  foreign  companies,  which  have  been much 
more advantageous for investors than taxing of portfolio investment gains. In fact, profit 
from foreign capital previously invested and declared in Brazil is exempt from taxes.  
 
CASE 2: Labeling fixed income investments as equity investments 
 
  As noted above, the control on Annex IV capital inflows applied to fixed income 
investments. However, equity investments were not restricted, because growth of the 
stock market was believed to lead to greater investment capacity for the companies and 
contributes to the economy’s expansion. Obviously, the market then sought to use the 
stock market to gain the coveted returns from the high Brazilian interest rates.  
This Case 2 and the following Case  3 refer to  avoidance  of capital controls 
through the stock market. Case 2 involves a transaction that also takes advantage of the 
structure of the S.A. corporation created in Case 1. 
  To bypass restrictions on fixed income investments via the securities market, the 
financial intermediary in Case 1 could use the corporation already created. The financial 
intermediary would then invest in the shares of that corporation. The means used would 
be the Annex IV channel for investments in the BOVESPA, which were permitted at 
that time and still today provide tax benefits for fixed income investments. Thus, the 
financial  intermediary  invested  his  off-shore  capital  like  a  foreign  investor  in  the 
BOVESPA by purchasing shares of the company he had opened. The amount paid for 
the shares was invested in fixed income and the returns remitted abroad as dividends or 
capital gains. Note that the financial intermediary could also manipulate the company’s 
share  prices,  since  it  owned  a  100%  stake.  Therefore,  the  investor  declared  equity 
investments while capturing the returns of fixed income.  
  Again the actual cost of the capital inflow in this case, the t*, was only the cost 
of opening the S.A. corporation and listing its shares on the exchange. The cost was low 
compared  to  the  financial  volume  invested,  and  it  was  also  diluted  as  the  investor 
invested, free of taxes, for several years. We can thus consider that t* was fixed and 
much lower than the official t. 
  The descriptions of Case 1 and Case 2 depict two similar methods of avoiding 
the restriction on gains from the short term interest rate in Brazil between 1993 and 
2000. The person interviewed did not, however, wish to go into great detail, but rather 
offered  a  general  overview.  For  the  third  form  of  circumvention,  which  we  will 
elaborate below, we were able to gather more details. It also involves disguising fixed 
income investment flows as equity investments in order to take advantage of the tax 
exemption provided for in Annex IV. 
   
CASE 3: ACC and Trading Companies 
 
  To control excessive capital inflows into Brazil, especially between 1993 and 
1996, many restrictions on raising external resources were imposed. The prohibition of 
foreign  investments  in  fixed  income  under  Annex  IV,  for  example,  made  it  more 
difficult to raise funds, since loaning resources at fixed interest rates, the investor had to 
pay the IOF tax, because the Annex IV channel was prohibited. Moreover, minimum 
                                                                                                                                          
IOF tax applied, at least US$ 500,000 in IOF (5%) expenses. The volume invested through this avoidance 
strategy can be much greater than US$ 10 million, so that t* could become negligible.    23 
terms were required for beginning loan amortization, meaning there were restrictions on 
short term loans. For example, in January 1993, a minimum period of 96 months was 
established  for  beginning  amortization  for  principal  and  interest  payments  to  be 
exempted from taxes.  
  At the same time, the use of Foreign Forward Currency Agreements (ACC) for 
exports allowed for financing of less than 360 days. The exporter could close an ACC 
up to one year before shipping merchandise. Theoretically, the ACC was exclusively for 
financing exports, and financing by this means required a physical outflow of exports 
associated with the contract to demonstrate that the loan had in fact been used to finance 
foreign trade. The market soon saw in this legislation a way to get short term loans, 
which additionally carried tax benefits. 
The interest rate for ACC funds was normally less than the CDI, the short-term-
benchmark interest rate in Brazil. This occurred because loans were less heavily taxed 
and because foreign investors seeking high return in Brazil offered capital at interest 
rates  below  the  country’s  base  rate  due  to  restrictions  on  other  investment  means. 
Furthermore, financing foreign trade generally carries relatively low risk, since most 
loans are released only after the export contract has been signed, and the exports serve 
as collateral.  
Therefore,  ACCs  constituted  a  means  of  getting  short  term  loans  with  tax 
benefits  and  interest  rates  below  the  CDI.  This  was  another  opportunity  that  the 
Brazilian financial market players eagerly grabbed. The restriction a financial investor 
had to circumvent to raise funds via ACCs was demonstrating that the financing was 
associated with merchandise exports. An agent had a one-year period after signing an 
ACC to ship the financed export product.  
The financial investor of course was not planning to use the resources to finance 
exports,  so  he  had  no  product  to  ship.  Exporters  conducting  foreign  trade  without 
ACCs, who did not use export financing, began selling their ACC rights to foreign 
investors. An ACC would then be signed to finance a specific export, but the capital 
would actually go to a financial investor who had purchased the exporter’s right.  
In this way, investors made short term investments at rates below the CDI using 
the ACCs, and were able to provide export documentation. Some exporters would pass 
this credit on to investors. In fact, until 2000 there was an underground market for 
export  credits,  that  is  to  say,  a  parallel  market  developed  for  trading  export 
documentation. An investor could simply make a loan to himself (disguised as an ACC, 
a loan to a Brazilian exporter) and buy this export documentation on the aforementioned 
market.  A  few  banks  even  established  trading  companies,  which  specialized  in 
financing foreign trade, to be able to better undertake this capital control avoidance 
strategy. These trading companies would contract ACC loans, then legalize the loan on 
the parallel market for trading ACC documentation. Since the financing cost was less 
than the CDI, a bank could close an ACC to finance its margin deposit on the BM&F 
(interest rate derivatives) or the overnight market, and capture good returns with these 
standard operations. However, the money that theoretically was destined for financing 
foreign trade was actually invested in short term fixed income investments. This is an 
important example of how difficult it is to apply, de facto, capital controls.  
This means of avoidance only decreased with the liberalization of fixed income 
investments and of the loan terms for foreign borrowing. Still today, though, financial 
market players consider ACCs a way to negotiate better interest rates, since the cost is 
less than the economy’s base interest rate. Therefore, there are clear indications that this 
avoidance strategy would be widely adopted if new restrictions on short term capital 
were imposed, such as applying an IOF tax on investments provided for in Resolution   24 
2689. Since Brazilian exports increased remarkably in the last years, this would pose an 
even larger hurdle to the effectiveness of capital controls nowadays. 
The capital inflow cost, the t*, was the amount required to build a financial and 
legal structure for implementing this method of avoidance. The cost is minimal for a 
large, functioning bank, which additionally was compensated by using funds borrowed 
at less than CDI rates and invested on the overnight market. Thus, depending on the 
financial volume, t* could be negative.  
 
2)      Using sophisticated financial engineering (derivatives) to avoid controls 
 
CASE 4: Development of the international derivatives market: avoiding convertibility 
risks. 
 
  An  increasingly  common  method  used  by  international  financial  markets  to 
avoid  imperfect  capital  mobility  in  emerging  countries  (capital  controls,  risk  of 
additional  controls,  and  convertibility  risks)  involves  foreign  derivatives  over-the-
counter operations, most notably in New York.  Foreign investors trade local assets, but 
without exposing themselves to the risks and costs of actually moving resources into the 
country.  
A classic example is the trading of Real against the U.S. Dollar futures in New 
York, the currency Non-Deliverable Forwards (NDF).  By trading this  asset in New 
York rather than on the BM&F in São Paulo, the foreign investor avoided all capital 
controls and convertibility risks.  
Garber [1998] analyzes the development of the international derivatives market 
and its impacts on capital flows and reports diverse ways that financial intermediaries 
circumvented regulations on credit risk using derivatives overseas. He also points out 
the possible role of these off-shore operations in avoiding capital controls.  
In recent years, the international derivatives market has substantially developed. 
One of the main engines of this transnational market is capital controls and currency 
convertibility  risk  in  emerging  market  countries.  They  offer  assets  with  greater 
volatility, which therefore have greater potential return, but the associated border risks 
hamper investing in the countries. Since the market wants to trade with them, it has 
developed international markets designed to avoid restrictions on capital mobility. The 
idea is to break down the risks involved, so that one can pick and choose which risks 
one wants, with the corresponding returns 
 
CASE 5: Investing through Box operations: Strategies with options for earning fixed 
income returns 
 
  Initially,  the Annex  IV  restriction  only applied to fixed income investments. 
Other types of investments, such as in securities and derivatives, could still use this 
channel. The market was able to use these types of investments to profit from Brazil’s 
short term interest rates. Cases 2 and 3 were methods of circumventing the control via 
the stock market. Another commonly used method was to use the derivatives market 
adopting options strategies that guaranteed fixed return, as we are about to see. 
  An  operation  was  conducted  that  was  known  as  a  Box,  consisting  of  four 
options, two calls and two puts, with the price on the established strike date fixed.  By a 
non arbitrage argument, it is shown that Box return must be equal to the benchmark   25 
interest  rate,  in  Brazil’s  case,  the  CDI.
24  A  Box  is,  therefore,  a  financial  strategy 
involving options that is akin to a loan.  
  Since derivatives investments were not restricted, the market began conducting 
Box operations on the BM&F and the BOVESPA to capture the return of Brazil’s high 
base interest rates. This lasted until the Central Bank detected this market movement 
and  subjected  Box  operations  to  the  same  regulations  that  applied  to  fixed  income 
investments. 
  The Box strategy actually went further than avoiding foreign capital controls: it 
also aimed at saving on taxes levied on domestic fixed income investments. Instead of 
using  traditional  means,  like  investing  in  government  bonds,  many  agents  began 
conducting Box operations on the BM&F and BOVESPA to earn fixed returns and 
bypass Brazil’s internal revenue service’s (Secretaria da Receita Federal) regulations. 
This form of tax avoidance ended when the Brazilian IRS (SRF) detected the loophole 
in the legislation and imposed the IOF tax on Box transactions as well. However, many 
agents were still able to disguise their Box operations.   
The cost of avoiding capital controls using the Box strategy, the t*, is only the 
cost of conducting the option transactions on an exchange. The operation itself has no 
more cost than traditional fixed income investments, because the difference between 
earnings from the buying and selling of the puts and calls is the amount invested. The 
cost difference may be only the brokerage fee charged by the financial agents, which is 
minimal in light of the volume invested. We can consider, then, that t* in this case is 
equal  to  zero.  Therefore,  this  legislation  loophole  rendered  the  capital  control 
completely ineffective.  
 
CASE 6: Increased Eurobond Issues with embedded options for bypassing the minimum 
loan term. 
 
  In August of 1995, the government set a 5% IOF tax on foreign loans in order to 
avoid  excessive  capital  inflows.  In  September  of  the  same  year,  the  government 
changed the legislation in an effort to encourage long term loans, establishing a sliding 
IOF according to the loan term. For up to two years, the tax was 5%; up to three years, 
4%; four years, 2%; five years, 1%; and six years or more, 0%.  
The market soon perceived in this legislation a chance for circumventing the 
restriction: it began raising resources through issues of long term bonds (over six years), 
but with embedded put option clauses. This meant the foreign creditor could shorten the 
loan term by exercising the option. In practice, therefore, the loan was short term.  
The  government  then  began  to  levy  a  retroactive  IOF  if  the  option  was 
exercised, and the borrower had to reverse the capital brought into the country within 
six years. Those interviewed in our field research stated that it was still advantageous to 
issue  a six-year bond  with a put option exercisable  within  one year,  even  with the 
retroactive IOF, because this did not eliminate the transaction’s gains. 
This  case  illustrates  the  difficulty  of  implementing,  in  practice,  controls  on 
capital  inflows.  It  is  an  example  of  a  contract  subject  to  capital  control  taxes  that 
encourages  the  short  term  investor  to  disguise  his  investments  as  long  term  while 
planning to recover the investment before it matures. 
Since the intent of capital controls was to deter excess volatility of capital flows, 
the renaming of actual short term flows as long term would seriously jeopardize it. After 
                                                
24 CDI (Interbank Certificate of Deposit) is the base overnight interest rate for transactions between 
financial institutions.    26 
all, if the status quo that prevailed when the investment was first made continued to 
hold, the short term capital would, ex post, became a long term investment. This appears 
to have been the case of Chile (Edwards, Valdés and De Gregorio [2000]). However, if 
conditions changed, and the carry-trade strategy no longer seemed to be a good deal, 
funds would be sent back home. The IOF tax would not be sufficient to keep the funds 
in the country if devaluation or default became very likely. For example, a 5% IOF tax 
would be sufficient to counterbalance a devaluation of only 10% within a year with a 
50% probability. After the Asian crisis, the odds for devaluation were certainly much 
higher  than  those,  which  explained  why  it  was  worth  to  issue  a six-year  bond  and 
exercise the option, paying the IOF tax retroactively, if the scenario changed. Carvalho 
[2005] develops a dynamic model that shows that the tax rates necessary to deter capital 
outflows  if a  confidence  or  currency  crisis  became  likely  would  be  too  high  to  be 
implemented. 
 
CASE  7:  Back  to  back  Operations:  Blue  Chip  Swaps  and  CC-5  transactions  for 
avoiding the IOF on exchange rate transactions.  
 
  In August of 1995, the government tightened capital controls in an attempt to 
contain excessive financial capital inflows, especially short term. It raised the IOF tax 
on foreign capital fixed income funds from 5% to 7%, raised the IOF on overseas loans 
from 0% to 5%, prohibited foreign investments in the domestic derivatives market,
25 
and established a 7% IOF on operations between institutions in the country and overseas 
through the floating rate exchange market.   
  The  market  avoided  the  IOF  on  fixed  income  investments  by  engineering 
financial operations like those previously described. But the IOF on operations between 
domestic and international institutions drove the market to find other loopholes in the 
exchange rate legislation: they found what they were looking for in the famous CC-5 
accounts. 
  The accounts of non-residents created by the Central Bank under Circular No. 5 
in 1969 were a resource for facilitating the flow of foreign capital. The CC-5 allowed a 
non-resident institution to hold an account in Brazil in national currency with greater 
ease to send funds outside the country. In 1992, the CC-5 was overhauled, giving this 
channel greater freedom implying higher capital account convertibility. With this new 
structure, the CC-5 deposit could be freely remitted through the floating rate exchange 
market. Moreover, third-party deposits could be made to the account, which meant third 
parties then began to make international transfers through the CC-5 account. This type 
of transfer became known later as the “International Transfer of Reais” (TIR).  
  Until  March  of  2005,  to  send  money  abroad  unilaterally,  a  resident  had  to 
deposit  it  in  the  CC-5  of  a  financial  institution  residing  outside  Brazil,  then  this 
institution would transfer it to his bank in Brazil, convert it into foreign currency, and 
send it overseas. The non-resident financial institution was usually an overseas branch 
of the domestic institution. With changes effected in March of 2005, the resident can 
now deposit the money directly in his bank. This simplification meant lower transaction 
costs and greater transparency on transfers.  
                                                
25 The complete prohibition of foreign investors to access domestic derivative markets was the logical 
culmination of the process that started with the tax on Box operations, described above. After all, there is 
a theorem in finance that states that any return may be reproduced by option trading if enough options are 
available. Therefore, taxing one strategy, as the Box, would only make the market move to another, still 
untaxed, one with quite similar results.   27 
CHART 12 
  Chart 12 below shows the movement of transfers through the CC-5 from January 
1993  until  2004.  It  also  contains  the  covered  interest  parity  differential  which  is  a 
measure of country risk. During periods of higher capital inflows to Brazil, even net 
inflows of capital through the CC-5 occur, as in 1995 through 1996.
26 In the exchange 
rate  band period (1995 to 1999), the CC-5 channel was more heavily used to send 
resources abroad. This is associated with the greater restrictions on capital during this 
period and with the economic turbulence that shook the Brazilian economy, namely the 




  Source: Central Bank of Brazil, BM&F and authors’ calculations   
 
The IOF established in August of 1995 on international transactions between 
financial institutions was assessed at the time of the exchange rate transaction (like a 
Tobin tax). So to bypass this tax, the market sought ways to avoid converting currency. 
One of these was what was called at the time a “Blue Chip Swap.” This involved a 
foreign asset that the investor would transfer to the off-shore branch of a Brazilian 
financial institution against a CC-5 credit of the investor in Brazil. The foreign investor 
delivered the foreign asset and the domestic counterpart made the deposit in Brazil in 
the foreign  agent’s  CC-5  account.  Through  the  CC-5,  the  foreign  investor  had free 
access  to  the  floating  rate  exchange  market  and  sent  the  money  abroad  without 
restrictions  when  the  operation  was  finalized.  With  this,  international  transactions 
between  financial  institutions  bypassed  the  IOF  tax  by  not  officially  converting 
currency.  
  These  operations  involving  unofficial  currency  exchange,  in  defiance  of  the 
Central Bank’s monopoly, were known as back to back operations. The Blue Chip Swap 
is one example of this type of operation. 
 
                                                
26 As Chart 4 clearly shows, the CC-5 net balance was clearly one of net transfers abroad.  Of course, 
gross flows occurred both ways. 
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CASE 8: Labeling fixed income investments as equity investments II: Share loans in 
Brazil and Swaps abroad 
 
  The  operation  described  in  Case  3  is  designed  for  a  domestic  financial 
intermediary that also seeks to offer off-shore mutual funds to foreign investors. In 
truth,  these  foreign  investors  could  include  Brazilians  with  non-declared  resources 
abroad or those seeking to capture the advantages extended to non-residents of investing 
in fixed income in Brazil.  
  The Brazilian financial intermediary would offer its off-shore clients a mutual 
fund in a tax haven that profited from Brazil’s short term interest rates. In theory, using 
Annex  IV  to  this  end  was  prohibited  due  to  the  capital  controls.  So,  the  financial 
intermediary engineered a financial transaction that enabled it to invest in fixed income 
via Annex IV, avoiding the restriction. With this operation, the financial intermediary 
was also able to save on taxes on the institution’s profit in Brazil. 
   The  strategy  basically  involved  the  financial  intermediary  borrowing  a 
company’s shares that had low liquidity on the BOVESPA, selling them in a buyback 
agreement with a foreign investor who entered under Annex IV, then conducting a swap 
outside the country with this investor to exchange returns. If it so desired, rather than 
borrowing  illiquid  shares,  the  financial  intermediary  could  create  a  publicly  held 
corporation, as in Cases 1 and 2.  
  Let us examine the case more thoroughly with the help of Figures 1, 2 and 3. In 
Figure 1 we present the operation’s agents: Bank X, which was Brazilian, had a branch 
in the Cayman Islands and wanted to offer an off-shore mutual fund that earned the 
returns of Brazil’s short term interest rate and whose quota holders were investors with 
foreign capital. The branch of Bank X in the tax haven managed this off-shore fund 
which invested in Brazilian fixed income.  
 























To  move  the  fund’s  capital  into  Brazil,  an  Annex  IV  Portfolio  for  equity 
investments was opened, and it was managed by the Securities Dealer (DTVM) of Bank 
X with headquarters in Brazil. With this, the agent of the Annex IV Portfolio was the 
domestic Securities Dealer, as required by legislation at that time. Investments regulated 
by Annex IV of Resolution 1289 had to be made according to this procedure, where a 
qualified  domestic  financial  institution  was  the  agent  of  the  foreign  investor’s 
Investment Portfolio.  
  The Securities Dealer of Bank X also retained its own portfolio for investments 
in fixed income, legally independent of this Annex IV Portfolio. The national resources 
of Bank X were allocated to this fixed income portfolio to capture the returns of the 
high domestic interest rate.  
  The bank also borrowed the shares of a company whose shares were listed on 
the  BOVESPA  and  had  very  little  liquidity.  It’s  worth  highlighting  that  this  was  a 
company  that  did  exist physically,  not  one  created  solely  for  financial transactions. 
Illiquidity was key to prevent sudden price moves.  
  In Figure 2 we present the beginning of the transactions, which we divide into 






(1) The off-shore fund invested in its Annex IV Portfolio declaring its objective 
was obtaining returns on equity investments, which was permitted and had tax benefits. 
(2) The Securities Dealer of Bank X borrowed the company’s shares, which we will call 
Z, and (3) sold them through a buyback agreement after a specified period of time to the 
Annex  IV  Portfolio  of  the  off-shore  fund.  The  buyback  agreement  established  the 
deadline for recovering the sale of the shares and stipulated that the buyback would be 
based on the share price on the day the contract expired. (4) The money from the sale of 
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the shares loaned to foreign investors was invested by the Securities Dealer in its own 
fixed income portfolio.  
   
The foreign investor, then, brought his resources into the country via Annex IV and 
transferred them to the Securities Dealer by purchasing the shares of Company Z. The 
Securities Dealer then invested this money in the overnight interest rate. 
    
Figure 3 illustrates the operation’s unwinding.  
 
  (5) The buyback agreement was then settled. The Annex IV Portfolio resold the 
shares to the bank’s Securities Dealer, but since the shares had very low liquidity, their 
prices were easily manipulated. The bank drove the share price up and repurchased 
them at a price higher than that at which he had sold them to the foreign investors. All 
players on the financial market know that the main rule is “buy low and sell high,” but 
in this case, the bank preferred to sell low and buy high. There was a reason for this: it 
enabled him to embed a loss for the Securities Dealer in this operation, reducing his 
profits. Bank X would then save on Brazilian taxes due on the Dealer’s profit, and as we 
shall see, recover the loss in Cayman through the derivatives market.  
  (6) After buying back the loaned shares, the Securities Dealer returned them to 
the Company Z shareholder who had entered into the loan agreement. (7) The return 
made by the Annex IV Portfolio of the foreign investors on the share purchase operation 
was sent abroad legally through Annex IV, since it was gained on the stock market. 
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(8) The Securities Dealer obtained the returns of its fixed income portfolio. (9) 
The Dealer then nationalized the money in its Cayman branch, which was perfectly 
legal. The amount sent to the tax haven was equal to the principal plus interest earned 
by the fixed income portfolio, that is, the amount desired by the off-shore fund offered 
by the Bank X branch in Cayman.  
FIGURE 3   31 
  So, the return the off-shore fund desires was still with the Bank X branch in 
Cayman, and the loss incurred by Bank X in the share transaction was passed as the 
profit of the off-shore fund. (10) To finalize the operation and meet its objectives, the 
bank conducted a swap in Cayman between its branch and the off-shore fund, where 
they exchanged the gains from the share transaction with the fixed income returns. The 
swap’s underlying instruments were the difference between the price of Company Z 
shares on the BOVESPA and the return on the Brazilian fixed rates, so the fixed income 
return went to the fund and the profit from the share transaction went to the branch of 
Bank X. 
   When concluded, the foreign investors had the fixed income returns and Bank X 
had saved on Brazilian taxes. The capital inflow cost incurred by this circumvention 
method, the t*, was only the price of borrowing the shares and conducting the swap 
abroad, plus that of the bank to nationalize the money in its Cayman branch. The latter 
two items have virtually no cost, so that t* is only the cost of the share loan. But since 
the bank saved on taxes, t* could actually be negative, as the tax savings offset the cost 
of the share loan. This strategy provides a clever example of how regular corporate 
income taxes could also be avoided through a financial operation originally designed to 
avoid capital controls.  
   
 
II.2  -  CONCLUSION  OF  CASES  OF  CAPITAL  CONTROLS 
CIRCUMVENTION 
 
  In this section, we have presented diverse strategies for circumventing controls 
on capital inflows in Brazil in the 1990s. Most strategies were designed to avoid the 
IOF  tax  on  fixed  income  investments  that  was  imposed  with  the  prohibition  of 
investments  in  government  bonds  using  the  Annex  IV  channel,  although  we  also 
reviewed cases with strategies for bypassing the IOF on foreign exchange transactions 
and the minimum terms for foreign loans.  
  Controls on capital inflows in Brazil varied based on two factors: the amount of 
capital inflows and the means the market found to bypass restrictions. 
 The first point was addressed by Goldfajn and Cardoso [1997], who pointed out 
the  endogeneity  of  capital  controls  in  Brazil.  In  periods  of  heavy  capital  inflows, 
restrictions  were  placed  on  the  capital  inflows;  and  in  periods  of  scarce  foreign 
financing, the controls were lifted so as to attract foreign capital.  
The second point was addressed in Garcia and Barcinski [1998] and in Garcia 
and Valpassos [2000], who pointed out the consecutive changes in legislation aimed at 
closing the loopholes the market found for circumventing restrictions. In fact, analyzing 
the composition of the total portfolio of Annex IV investments, one readily perceives 
the game  of “cat and mouse” underway between the Central  Bank / CMN  and the 
financial market.  
Table 1 shows the composition of the total portfolio of Annex IV investments 
from January 1993 until mid 2004 (since 1999, these investments have actually been 
governed by Resolution 2689).  
Between  January  1993  and  August  1993,  the  “Others”  item  in  the  table 
accounted for around 15% to 25% of total investment. This item contained investments 
in  government  bonds  that  were  destined  for  fixed  income  gains.  Investments  in 
government  bonds  directed  toward  privatization  were  discriminated  in  the  item 
“Privatization Funds.” The other portfolio components were investments in securities,   32 
derivatives and debentures.  Since  2000 and  the  publication of Resolution 2689, the 
fixed income investments item has been distinguished from the “Others” item.  
With the August 1993 prohibition of Annex IV fixed income investments, the 
25% of “Others” in the portfolio has fallen to approximately just 1%, since investments 
in government bonds with this objective could no longer be declared under Annex IV. 
The investments then had to be made via special fixed income funds for foreign capital, 
which incurred an IOF tax of 5% to 9%.   
However,  in  the  month  following  this  prohibition,  September  of  1993,  the 
percentage  of  debenture  investments  jumped  from  4%  to  19%,  reaching  34%  in 
November, indicating the market had begun circumventing by investing in debentures 
that  earned  fixed  income,  such  as  those  of  the  Siderbrás  Company.  At  the  end  of 
November of 1993, the government placed a restriction on some debenture investments, 
but only in February of 1996 prohibited investing in those of Siderbrás.  
After debenture investments were restricted in November of 1993, the market 
began bypassing the IOF tax on fixed income investments using the loophole for using 
privatization  funds  and  the  derivatives  market  (using  Box  operations,  as  explained 
above). The table shows that the percentage of privatization funds rose in September of 
2003  and  peaked  at  almost  10%  of  the  Annex  IV  portfolio  in  June  of  1994.  The 
government  then  prohibited  NTN  investments  as  privatization  resources,  precluding 
fixed income gains through this loophole. The percentages for derivatives were only 
made available beginning in March of 1994, and we are unable to trace the development 
of these flows.  
Finally, only equity investing was left unrestricted, and the other items were 
subject to diverse rules before permitted to invest through Annex IV. The market then 
began to use circumvention strategies involving the stock market, as seen in Cases 2 and 
3 in the previous section. Another method that has been adopted since August of 1993 
was disguising short term capital as direct investments, as described in Case 1. These 
two methods for circumventing the controls were not prohibited by any legal measure. 
Strategies such as the one in Case 2 may still be used by financial institutions seeking to 
avoid the income tax on fixed income gains, which is higher than that on capital market 
gains, or to invest in fixed income for less than 90 days without paying the 5% IOF tax.   
The market, then, appears to always find a means of circumventing restrictions 
placed on foreign capital, rendering capital controls ineffective in the medium term. 
However, the price to be paid in terms of how the market is viewed when controls are 
imposed  could  endure  for  some  time.  Some  argue  that  ex  ante  controls  on  capital 
inflows  do  not  compromise  the  country’s  reputation  and  are  prudent  measures  for 
avoiding destabilization caused by excessive capital inflows. However, to quote one of 
the financial market agents that we interviewed in our field research: “An ex-alcoholic 
can’t touch a bottle of whiskey.” Also, the operations of controls on capital inflows are 
not very well understood, and may create misunderstandings harmful to the country’s 
reputation. For example, in the aftermath of the Mexican 1994 crisis, Brazil reduced the 
IOF on capital inflows. The (albeit temporary) reduction of a tax should be considered a 
liberalization;  however,  it  was  taken  by  two  highly  trained  scholars  as  just  the 
opposite.
27 
                                                
27 “Capital flows to developing countries fell by one-fifth from 1993 to 1994, with the February rise in 
U.S. interest rates often viewed as the turning point. At the same time, while some countries stayed the 
course to liberalization, others which had earlier liberalized (for example, Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador, 
and Nigeria) resorted to re-imposing capital controls or to tightening existing regulations and delaying 
announced liberalization plans.” Drazen and Bartolini [1997]   33 
  As expressed in Forbes [2003a], economic literature has still not been able to 
prove conclusively that imposing controls on capital inflows effectively reduces the 
vulnerability of the countries that employ them. Quoting Forbes [2003a]: “...although 
capital account liberalization may increase country vulnerability to crises in some cases, 
the relationship between capital controls and financial crises is not so straightforward.”  
However,  the  literature  extensively  defends  increased  liberalization  of  the  capital 
account: financing via foreign savings allows for more investment, increased potential 
GDP, and intertemporal consumption smoothing. 
  Our  main  conclusion  is  that  although  from  a  welfare  point  of  view  ex  ante 
capital  controls  may  be  desirable  in  certain  cases,  their  implementation  when 
sophisticated financial markets are present is very difficult. This ineffectiveness comes 
from three facts: 
1)  developed financial markets are very good in performing arbitrage; 
2)  capital is fungible; 
3)  usually, a country wants to control only a few forms of capital inflows (e.g., 
short-term portfolio investments) while providing total freedom to other forms 
(e.g., long term fixed investment). 
With  these  three  characteristics  financial  markets  can  lower  the  cost  of  effectively 
investing in the country, as we have documented for Brazil.
28 
 
                                                
28 One market player remarked that things may have changed somewhat in regards to the ability of the 
financial market to avoid controls. This would be because current legislation carries penal liabilities to the 
partners  of institutions that are found guilty  of breaching the legislation. Therefore, financial market 
players may have become more risk averse in devising financial engineering strategies to avoid capital 
controls, but that remains to be seen.   34 
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V - CONCLUSION 
 
We have analyzed the effectiveness of controls on capital inflows in restricting 
and selecting financial inflows. We saw that in Brazil in the 1990s, controls on capital 
inflows only effectively limited financial inflows for short periods: two to six months. 
The hypothesis we submitted was that operations aimed at avoiding capital controls 
during this period rendered ineffective the measures and restrictions. We gave numerous 
examples of the operations that were reportedly used in this period, and that allowed 
external investors to invest in Brazil while bypassing government restrictions.     
The ability to circumvent controls on capital inflows implies that the cost of 
short term capital inflows is not necessarily the official tax rate imposed by the capital 
controls, but rather the lesser of the two between the official tax rate and the cost of 
avoiding  the  controls. We  reported  numerous  cases  in  Brazil  during  the  1990s  that 
showed that the cost of circumventing capital controls in that period was less than that 
of complying with regulation. As such, the effectiveness of measures restricting capital 
inflows was very limited. We conducted an analysis using impulse response functions to 
measure the effectiveness of inflow controls in restricting financial inflows in Brazil in 
the 1990s, and we found that the measures were able to reduce capital inflows for up to 
six months. Financial inflows through the Annex IV channel – which were often seen as 
the short term villains at the time – were even less affected, and reversed the impact of 
the restriction in only two to three months.  
The impact of capital controls avoidance on their effectiveness has not yet been 
thoroughly  addressed  in  economic  literature.  It  is  common  to  assume  that 
implementation of the controls is a given, and to disregard the effect of circumvention. 
However, the imposition of capital controls will be influenced by the following factors: 
the  development  of  the  domestic  financial  market  and  alternatives  in  overseas 
derivatives markets (which enlarge avoidance alternatives); the ability of authorities to 
monitor  inflows;  the  penalties  for  avoidance;  and,  the  most  difficult  to  prevent, 
regulation loopholes.  
In summary, the effectiveness of controls on capital inflows will depend on the 
market’s ability to circumvent restrictions and the government’s ability to establish a 
covered  interest  parity  differential  that  will  balance  capital  flows.  As  long  as  the 
country’s risk-adjusted earnings are attractive for the carry-trade strategy, controls on 
capital inflows will be at best only temporarily effective in a developed, sophisticated 
financial  market.  And  policy-makers  should  take  this  restriction  into  account  when 
designing economic policies. Capital controls may very well be desirable, a topic we do 
not discuss here. But if they are ineffective, there is no point in spending the scarce 
resources of bank supervision trying to implement them. Instead, improving economic 
policy should be the main focus.   37 
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VII - APPENDIX: Others circumvention methods 
 
CASE 9: Privatization Currency 
 
Another loophole in Brazil’s capital control legislation between 1993 and 1995 
was that it granted permission for funds investing in the country’s privatization to use 
Annex IV for investing in National Treasury Notes (NTNs). Initial legislation sought to 
encourage inflows of foreign capital directed at investments in privatization, but the 
market  began  establishing  short  term  fixed  income  investments  as  privatization 
investments, thereby capturing the tax benefits of investing in Brazil’s domestic debt 
through Annex IV. This  method of capital  controls  avoidance seemed to  be widely 
employed. One indication is that the flow for privatization via Annex IV between April 
and July of 1993 averaged US$4.36 millions.  In August of 1993, a capital control was 
applied  that  prohibited  fixed  income  investments  via  Annex  IV  and  permitted  only 
investing through specific fixed income funds that were subject to a 5% IOF tax. In 
September  of  1993,  the  flow  declared  as  privatization  resources  rose  to  US$176 
millions.  This  means  that  when  fixed  income  investments  were  restricted,  the  flow 




CASE 10: Resolution 63 “CAIPIRA”(“Country 63”) 
 
  Another strategy for raising foreign funds with tax benefits was provided for by 
Central Bank of Brazil Resolution No. 63 for agriculture financing. The operation was 
similar to those involving ACCs. Rural producers were permitted to borrow abroad, 
with tax benefits, and began selling them to financial investors, so that short term loans 
declaring agricultural destinations were a common market practice. The loan, however, 
was redirected to financial market transactions.  
In general, the cost of these loans was also less than the CDI. This meant that the 
same strategy undertook with ACCs could be replicated with the “63 Caipira,” that is, 
raising funds at a cost well below the CDI and investing the money in the overnight 
market or in margin deposits required by the BM&F interest derivatives. The capital 
that in theory was for agriculture investments was actually redirected to short term fixed   41 
income investments. The transaction was strictly within legal boundaries, because rural 
producers officially took out the loans. 
  Through this “63 Caipira” strategy, investors raised funds at short term rates to 
perform the “carry-trade”. At the same time, investors with foreign capital could use 
this channel to invest in fixed income given the ease with which it was redirected to the 
financial market. This legislation loophole meant gains for both the borrower and the 
lender.  
  Only in 1996 did the Central Bank limit transactions using Resolution 63. The 
institution’s 1996 Report clarified: 
 
“In  order  to  avoid  the  application  of  resources  from  long  term  loans  in 
speculative investments, Circular No. 2.660, of 2.8.96, limited the alternatives 
for  investing  funds  raised  under  Resolution  63  when  not  used  by  their  final 
borrower.”  
 
  The next case of circumvention involves a loophole in legislation that permitted 
investments  in  debentures  under  Annex  IV.  Prices  of  some  of  the  debentures  were 
linked to Brazil’s benchmark interest rate, opening a door for bypassing restrictions on 
fixed income investments.  
 
CASE 11: Siderbrás debentures, and others.  
 
  One  method  for  avoid  the  restriction  on  fixed  income  investments  with  tax 
benefits provided for by Annex IV was to take advantage of the loophole in legislation 
that permitted investing in debentures through this channel. Between August 1993 and 
November 1993, this loophole allowed investors to earn the returns of fixed income by 
investing in debentures that were linked to the base interest rate. One example involved 
the debentures of the company Siderbrás. 
In August of 1993, the volume of debenture investments under Annex IV was 
US$ 275 million, or 4% of the total Annex IV Portfolio in the country. In September, 
after the capital control was introduced, this amount jumped to US$ 1.3 billion, and in 
November of 1993 reached its highest to date at US$3 billion, or 34% of the portfolio. 
In November of 1993, the government prohibited debenture investments using Annex 
IV, closing the door on this form of circumvention.   
In this section’s conclusion, we exhibit a table with the composition of the total 
Annex IV Portfolio in the country, and we analyzed, as in Garcia & Barcinski [1998], 
the dynamic of flow shifts among items in Annex IV prompted by capital controls.  
The cost of bypassing controls by investing in  debentures, the t*, was zero, 
because the yield of these debt instruments was tied to the interest rates sought by 
investors, and moreover offered the tax benefits of Annex IV investments.  
 